Theorem Catalog
93 proved · 0 sorry · 93 total
Condition Key Evaluation (IamExplainer.Condition)
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | evalCond_noContext_T_imp | |
| 🟢 proved | evalCond_noContext_tu |
IamExplainer.Ghost.XAGhost
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | critical_is_top | |
| 🟢 proved | xaTrust_ghost_conservative |
SCPs, Permission Boundaries, and RCPs (IamExplainer.Layers)
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | evalLayers_blocked_noContext_empty | |
| 🟢 proved | evalLayers_noLayers_blocked |
End-to-End IAM Authorization Proofs (IamExplainer.Proofs)
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | allows_nocontext_conservative | |
| 🟢 proved | allows_replaceAllow_mono | |
| 🟢 proved | allows_replace_stmt_mono | Generalized statement replacement mono |
| 🟢 proved | emitFixed_narrows | |
| 🟢 proved | grants_complete | Grants completeness and no-context conservatism |
| 🟢 proved | layer_add_monotone | |
| 🟢 proved | layered_nocontext_conservative | |
| 🟢 proved | layers_narrow | Layer theorems: layered evaluation only narrows access. |
| 🟢 proved | matchPattern_ci_congr | |
| 🟢 proved | narrowActions_narrows | |
| 🟢 proved | narrowResources_narrows | NEW: narrowResources_narrows (T3) |
| 🟢 proved | removeAllow_narrows | |
| 🟢 proved | stmtGrantsAction_ci_congr | |
| 🟢 proved | stmtGrantsAction_narrow |
Seclib.Compose.Coverage
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | allPass_no_fire | Coverage claims: if all controls pass, chains cannot fire. Go source: chain_engi |
| 🟢 proved | coverage_soundness | |
| 🟢 proved | empty_failing_no_fire |
Seclib.Compose.Dependencies
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | failClosed_diagnoses_notRun | Go source: chain_engine.go:494-500 — fail_closed diagnoses on notRun. |
| 🟢 proved | failClosed_diagnoses_unknown | Go source: chain_engine.go:494-500 — fail_closed diagnoses on unknown. |
| 🟢 proved | failOpen_never_diagnoses | Go source: chain_engine.go:505-506 — fail_open never annotates. |
| 🟢 proved | ranOK_never_diagnoses | Go source: chain_engine.go:494-506 — ranOK never triggers any fallback. |
Seclib.Compose.Distance
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | chainDistance_mono | |
| 🟢 proved | classify_exploitable_of_fires | |
| 🟢 proved | classify_mono_via_distance | Adding failures can only move exploitability toward exploitable (never away from |
| 🟢 proved | fires_of_classify_exploitable | |
| 🟢 proved | no_nearMiss_threshold_one |
Seclib.Compose.Monotonicity
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | chainFires_add_one | |
| 🟢 proved | chainFires_mono | |
| 🟢 proved | failingCount_le_length | failingCount is bounded by the chain’s control count. |
| 🟢 proved | failingCount_mono | |
| 🟢 proved | firingSet_mono | Set-level monotonicity: the set of firing chains never shrinks when the failing |
Seclib.CrossAccount.Monotonicity
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | chain_step_necessary | Removing a failing step from a chain at threshold breaks it. |
| 🟢 proved | condition_blocks_wildcard | |
| 🟢 proved | coverage_monotone | Monotonicity and soundness proofs for cross-account trust model. |
| 🟢 proved | externalId_blocks_wildcard | |
| 🟢 proved | orgCondition_blocks_wildcard | |
| 🟢 proved | partition_complete | |
| 🟢 proved | wildcard_complete |
Policy Evaluation Semantics (Seclib.Domain.PolicySem)
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | filterMap_narrows | |
| 🟢 proved | grants_complete | grants_complete: if allowed, an Allow statement exists that matches |
| 🟢 proved | narrow_narrows | narrow_narrows: replacing a statement with one that matches fewer requests narro |
| 🟢 proved | nocontext_conservative | nocontext_conservative: if allowed under any context, allowed under noCtx |
| 🟢 proved | removeAllow | removeAllow: removing an Allow statement narrows access |
Seclib.Ghost
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | ghost_composition | When scope B resolves a ghost from scope A, the conservative finding from A is s |
| 🟢 proved | ghost_contradiction_detected | Two controls with incompatible ghost assumptions on the same reference cannot co |
Seclib.IAM.Monotonicity
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | barrier_demotes | A blocked escalation path is not distance-0 (not exploitable). Barriers demote e |
| 🟢 proved | iam_exploitable_matches_compose | An exploitable IAM escalation maps to Compose’s .exploitable classification. Go |
| 🟢 proved | iam_oneaway_matches_compose | A one-away IAM escalation maps to Compose’s .oneAway classification. |
| 🟢 proved | perm_boundary_monotone | Adding a permission boundary action to a graph that has no escalation path canno |
| 🟢 proved | priv_transitive | If A can reach B and B can reach C, then A can reach C. Soufflé source: rules.dl |
| 🟢 proved | scp_deny_monotone | Adding an SCP deny statement to a graph that has no escalation path cannot creat |
Seclib.Network.Monotonicity
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | List.any_of_any_append_left | If any holds on a list, it holds on a superset (append). Go source: reachabili |
| 🟢 proved | canReach_mono_abstract | If membership is preserved, any is preserved. Go source: reachability.go:36-51 |
| 🟢 proved | gated_not_unsat | If a gated egress path exists and no sink path exists, transitiveEgressVerdict r |
| 🟢 proved | isolation_sound | If a host is tagged isolated and no host in the graph can reach it on any port ( |
| 🟢 proved | rule_check_mono | Abstract monotonicity: if a predicate holds when checking any over a set of ru |
| 🟢 proved | transitiveEgress_decomposition | Transitive egress decomposes into two reachability queries: (1) isolated → servi |
| 🟢 proved | unsat_no_gated | Contrapositive: if verdict is UNSAT, no gated path exists. Go source: proof.go:4 |
Action and Resource Pattern Matching (Seclib.Prim.Glob)
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | ciEq_toLowerStr | |
| 🟢 proved | matchPatternGo_literal_eq | |
| 🟢 proved | matchPattern_cs_literal_eq | |
| 🟢 proved | matchPattern_literal_mp | |
| 🟢 proved | toLower_eq_question | |
| 🟢 proved | toLower_eq_star |
Statement Combining — Deny Overrides (Seclib.Prim.Rule)
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | appliesOf_unknown_conservative | Lemma 4: Unknown applicability is conservative |
| 🟢 proved | conj_narrows | Lemma 3: Conjunction of evaluation gates never widens access |
| 🟢 proved | denyOverrides_add_deny_narrows | Lemma 2: Adding a deny narrows |
| 🟢 proved | denyOverrides_remove_allow_narrows | Lemma 1: Removing an allow rule narrows access |
Seclib.Schema.Capability
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | builtinCapabilities_length |
Seclib.Schema.Properties
| Status | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 proved | appliesToAssetType_contains | |
| 🟢 proved | appliesToAssetType_empty_means_all | ### Theorem 3: Catalog-schema coupling For every control in a catalog, if it dec |
| 🟢 proved | builtin_nonempty | ### Theorem 5: Capability liveness Every capability in the builtin set is a stri |
| 🟢 proved | capability_membership | |
| 🟢 proved | cel_validation_types | ### CEL validation type coverage requiresCELValidation is true exactly for unsaf |
| 🟢 proved | contains_requires_value | |
| 🟢 proved | embed_set_equality | ### Theorem 4: Embed invariant If two sorted lists of control IDs are equal, the |
| 🟢 proved | empty_predicate_no_fields | ### Predicate emptiness An empty predicate yields no field paths. |
| 🟢 proved | eq_requires_value | |
| 🟢 proved | fieldPath_strip_properties_cons | ### Theorem 1: Schema-predicate consistency Every field path in a predicate that |
| 🟢 proved | list_empty_no_value | |
| 🟢 proved | missing_no_value | ### Theorem 2: Null safety Operators missing, present, and list_empty do n |
| 🟢 proved | ne_requires_value | |
| 🟢 proved | null_safety_complete | |
| 🟢 proved | operator_count | |
| 🟢 proved | operator_exhaustive | |
| 🟢 proved | present_no_value | |
| 🟢 proved | severity_total_order | ### Severity ordering is total |
Dependency Graph
Nodes: 🟢 proved, 🟡 sorry, ⚪ definition.
Seclib.Compose.Basic
ChainDef — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A chain definition: controls that co-fail to create compound risk. Go source: internal/core/controldef/chain.go:14-65
structure ChainDef where
FailingControl — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A (control, asset) pair with an active violation. Go source: internal/core/evaluation/risk/chain_engine.go:18-21
structure FailingControl where
failingSet — ⚪ definition
def · source
The set of failing control IDs, ignoring asset grouping for now. The Go engine groups by scope/asset; the core composition predicate only needs the set of failing control IDs within one scope bucket.
def failingSet (failures : List FailingControl) : List ControlId
Seclib.Compose.Bridge
BridgeRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Contract test bridge: parse JSONL from the Go engine export, run chainFires / chainDistance on the same inputs, compare verdicts. Go source: bridge_gen.py produces the JSONL; this module consumes it.
structure BridgeRecord where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : FromJson BridgeRecord where
mkChainDef — ⚪ definition
def · source
Build a ChainDef from a bridge record. Returns none if structural invariants don’t hold (< 2 controls or threshold out of range).
def mkChainDef (r : BridgeRecord) : Option ChainDef
CheckResult — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CheckResult where
checkRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
Check one bridge record against the Lean composition model.
def checkRecord (r : BridgeRecord) : Option String
checkAll — ⚪ definition
def · source
Run the bridge checker on parsed records.
def checkAll (records : List BridgeRecord) : CheckResult
parseJsonl — ⚪ definition
def · source
Parse a JSONL string into bridge records.
def parseJsonl (content : String) : List BridgeRecord
bridgeCheck — ⚪ definition
def · source
Main bridge checker entry point.
def bridgeCheck (path : System.FilePath) : IO UInt32
Seclib.Compose.BridgeMain
main — ⚪ definition
def · source
CLI wrapper for the bridge checker. Go source: bridge_gen.py produces the JSONL consumed here.
def main (args : List String) : IO UInt32
Seclib.Compose.Compose
failingCount — ⚪ definition
def · source
Count how many of the chain’s controls appear in the failing set. Go source: chain_engine.go:166-172 (failing/holding partition)
def failingCount (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : Nat
chainFires — ⚪ definition
def · source
A chain fires when enough member controls fail. Go source: chain_engine.go:174 —
len(failing) < chain.EscalationThresholdis the skip condition; negating it gives the firing predicate.
def chainFires (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : Prop
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) :
chainFiresB — ⚪ definition
def · source
Boolean version for computation.
def chainFiresB (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : Bool
controlsFailing — ⚪ definition
def · source
The controls in the chain that are failing.
def controlsFailing (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : List ControlId
missingSafeguards — ⚪ definition
def · source
The controls in the chain that are holding (not failing).
def missingSafeguards (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : List ControlId
Seclib.Compose.Coverage
allPass_no_fire — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Coverage claims: if all controls pass, chains cannot fire. Go source: chain_engine.go:64-147 (DetectChains).
theorem allPass_no_fire (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId)
(h : ∀ c, c ∈ chain.controls → c ∉ failing) :
¬ chainFires chain failing
empty_failing_no_fire — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem empty_failing_no_fire (chain : ChainDef) :
¬ chainFires chain []
coverage_soundness — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem coverage_soundness (chains : List ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId)
(h : ∀ chain, chain ∈ chains →
Seclib.Compose.Dependencies
ImplicitDep — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Go source: internal/core/controldef/chain.go:153-167
structure ImplicitDep where
shouldDiagnose — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: internal/core/evaluation/risk/chain_engine.go:492-506 (AnnotateDependencies switch)
def shouldDiagnose (fallback : DependencyFallback) (status : DependencyStatus) : Bool
failClosed_diagnoses_notRun — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Go source: chain_engine.go:494-500 — fail_closed diagnoses on notRun.
theorem failClosed_diagnoses_notRun :
failClosed_diagnoses_unknown — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Go source: chain_engine.go:494-500 — fail_closed diagnoses on unknown.
theorem failClosed_diagnoses_unknown :
failOpen_never_diagnoses — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Go source: chain_engine.go:505-506 — fail_open never annotates.
theorem failOpen_never_diagnoses (status : DependencyStatus) :
shouldDiagnose .failOpen status = false
ranOK_never_diagnoses — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Go source: chain_engine.go:494-506 — ranOK never triggers any fallback.
theorem ranOK_never_diagnoses (fb : DependencyFallback) :
shouldDiagnose fb .ranOK = false
Seclib.Compose.Distance
chainDistance — ⚪ definition
def · source
Distance metric: how far is a chain from firing? Go source: finding_risk.go:11-24, chain_engine.go:432
def chainDistance (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : Nat
classify — ⚪ definition
def · source
def classify (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : Exploitability
classify_exploitable_of_fires — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem classify_exploitable_of_fires (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId)
(h : chainFires chain failing) :
classify chain failing = .exploitable
fires_of_classify_exploitable — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem fires_of_classify_exploitable (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId)
(h : classify chain failing = .exploitable) :
chainFires chain failing
isNearMiss — ⚪ definition
def · source
def isNearMiss (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) : Prop
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) :
no_nearMiss_threshold_one — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem no_nearMiss_threshold_one (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId)
(hT : chain.threshold = 1) :
¬ isNearMiss chain failing
chainDistance_mono — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem chainDistance_mono (chain : ChainDef) (s t : List ControlId) :
chainDistance chain (s ++ t) ≤ chainDistance chain s
Exploitability.rank — ⚪ definition
def · source
Exploitability order: exploitable < oneAway < reachable. “Closer to firing” = lower value.
def Exploitability.rank : Exploitability → Nat
| .exploitable => 0
| .oneAway => 1
| .reachable => 2
classify_mono_via_distance — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Adding failures can only move exploitability toward exploitable (never away from it). Proved via the underlying distance metric.
theorem classify_mono_via_distance (chain : ChainDef) (s t : List ControlId)
(h : classify chain s = .exploitable) :
classify chain (s ++ t) = .exploitable
Seclib.Compose.Monotonicity
failingCount_mono — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem failingCount_mono (chain : ChainDef) (s t : List ControlId) :
failingCount chain s ≤ failingCount chain (s ++ t)
chainFires_mono — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem chainFires_mono (chain : ChainDef) (s t : List ControlId)
(h : chainFires chain s) : chainFires chain (s ++ t)
chainFires_add_one — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem chainFires_add_one (chain : ChainDef) (s : List ControlId) (f : ControlId)
(h : chainFires chain s) : chainFires chain (s ++ [f])
firingSet_mono — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Set-level monotonicity: the set of firing chains never shrinks when the failing set grows. Every chain that fires on s also fires on s ++ t. This is the deliverable-4 property from the LEAN4-COMPOSE spec.
theorem firingSet_mono (chains : List ChainDef) (s t : List ControlId) :
failingCount_le_length — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
failingCount is bounded by the chain’s control count.
theorem failingCount_le_length (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) :
failingCount chain failing ≤ chain.controls.length
Seclib.CrossAccount.Boundary
oosPairs — ⚪ definition
def · source
The 13 OOS pairs — services with negligible enterprise prevalence. Go source: ca-triage-table.md (13 OOS).
def oosPairs : List TrustPair
coveredPairs — ⚪ definition
def · source
The 51 covered pairs — services with active controls.
def coveredPairs : List TrustPair
CrossAccountDisclosure — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Disclosure: when Stave reports no cross-account findings, it means “no finding in the covered 51 pairs.” The 13 OOS pairs are not evaluated.
structure CrossAccountDisclosure where
Seclib.CrossAccount.Bridge
GrantRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Contract test bridge for cross-account trust model. Parses JSONL records, evaluates Lean predicates, compares results. Two record types: Grant record: tests wildcardGrant, conditionedGrant, scopedGrant Coverage record: tests pairCoverage verdict
structure GrantRecord where
CoverageRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CoverageRecord where
parseMechanism — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseMechanism : String → Option Mechanism
| "resourcePolicy" => some .resourcePolicy
| "trustPolicy" => some .trustPolicy
| "grant" => some .grant
| "accessPoint" => some .accessPoint
| "sharingAPI" => some .sharingAPI
| "replicationConfig" => some .replicationConfig
| "accessEntry" => some .accessEntry
| "podIdentity" => some .podIdentity
| "oidcFederation" => some .oidcFederation
| "invitationDelegation" => some .invitationDelegation
| "attributeShare" => some .attributeShare
| "association" => some .association
| "ramShare" => some .ramShare
| _ => none
parseDirection — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseDirection : String → Option Direction
| "inboundGrant" => some .inboundGrant
| "outboundFlow" => some .outboundFlow
| "both" => some .both
| _ => none
verdictToString — ⚪ definition
def · source
def verdictToString : CoverageVerdict → String
| .covered => "covered"
| .uncovered => "uncovered"
| .oos => "oos"
| .schemaBlocked => "schemaBlocked"
| .evidenceGated => "evidenceGated"
parseGrantRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseGrantRecord (j : Json) : Except String GrantRecord
parseCoverageRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseCoverageRecord (j : Json) : Except String CoverageRecord
checkGrantRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkGrantRecord (r : GrantRecord) : Bool × String
checkCoverageRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkCoverageRecord (r : CoverageRecord) : Bool × String
parseAndCheckLine — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseAndCheckLine (line : String) : Option (Bool × String)
bridgeCheck — ⚪ definition
def · source
def bridgeCheck (path : System.FilePath) : IO UInt32
Seclib.CrossAccount.BridgeMain
main — ⚪ definition
def · source
def main (args : List String) : IO UInt32
Seclib.CrossAccount.Coverage
pairCoverage — ⚪ definition
def · source
The 64-pair taxonomy as a decidable coverage function. Go source: cross-account-v1.yaml (55 services, 64 pairs). Encodes the terminal ledger: 51 COVERED, 13 OOS.
def pairCoverage : TrustPair → CoverageVerdict
allPairs — ⚪ definition
def · source
The set of all 64 pairs in the taxonomy.
def allPairs : List TrustPair
catalogCovers — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a set of pairs is fully covered by the catalog.
def catalogCovers (pairs : List TrustPair) : Prop
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance (pairs : List TrustPair) : Decidable (catalogCovers pairs)
Seclib.CrossAccount.Grant
GrantConditions — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Conditions that constrain a cross-account trust grant. Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.EXTERNALID.001, CTL.IAM.POLICY.CONDITION.ORGID.001.
structure GrantConditions where
TrustGrant — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A concrete trust grant with conditions. Go source: individual control YAML unsafe_predicate fields.
structure TrustGrant where
wildcardGrant — ⚪ definition
def · source
Target is wildcard (* or broad). Any principal from any account. Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.EXTERNAL.CLOUD.001, CTL.OPENSEARCH.POLICY.CROSSACCOUNT.WILDCARD.001.
def wildcardGrant (g : TrustGrant) : Bool
conditionedGrant — ⚪ definition
def · source
Grant has conditions that meaningfully constrain access. Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.EXTERNALID.001 + CTL.IAM.POLICY.CONDITION.ORGID.001.
def conditionedGrant (g : TrustGrant) : Bool
scopedGrant — ⚪ definition
def · source
Grant target is a specific account (not wildcard). Go source: non-wildcard principal patterns in control predicates.
def scopedGrant (g : TrustGrant) : Bool
Seclib.CrossAccount.Invariants
noWildcardTrust — ⚪ definition
def · source
No wildcard trust grant exists for a service. Go source: CTL..POLICY.CROSSACCOUNT.WILDCARD., CTL.IAM.TRUST.EXTERNAL.CLOUD.001. Topology-level: no edge from any account grants access to * for the service.
def noWildcardTrust (t : Topology) (svc : Service) : Prop
orgBounded — ⚪ definition
def · source
All trust grants for a service stay within an org boundary. Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.ORGBOUNDARY.001, CTL.IAM.POLICY.CONDITION.ORGID.001. Simplified: all target accounts share a prefix with the source.
def orgBounded (t : Topology) (orgPrefix : String) : Prop
externalIdEnforced — ⚪ definition
def · source
Every cross-account AssumeRole trust policy requires ExternalId. Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.EXTERNALID.001, CTL.IAM.TRUST.EXTERNALID.SCOPED.001.
def externalIdEnforced (grants : List TrustGrant) : Prop
noExfiltration — ⚪ definition
def · source
No outbound-flow grant exists for a service (no data exfiltration path). Go source: CTL.EC2.EBS.CROSSACCOUNT.SNAPSHOT.* (attribute-share outbound controls).
def noExfiltration (t : Topology) (svc : Service) : Prop
Seclib.CrossAccount.Monotonicity
coverage_monotone — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Monotonicity and soundness proofs for cross-account trust model.
theorem coverage_monotone (p : TrustPair)
(h : pairCoverage p = .covered) :
wildcard_complete — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem wildcard_complete (g : TrustGrant)
(hTarget : g.target = "*")
(hNoExtId : g.conditions.hasExternalId = false)
(hNoOrg : g.conditions.hasOrgCondition = false) :
wildcardGrant g = true
externalId_blocks_wildcard — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem externalId_blocks_wildcard (g : TrustGrant)
(h : g.conditions.hasExternalId = true) :
wildcardGrant g = false
orgCondition_blocks_wildcard — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem orgCondition_blocks_wildcard (g : TrustGrant)
(h : g.conditions.hasOrgCondition = true) :
wildcardGrant g = false
condition_blocks_wildcard — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem condition_blocks_wildcard (g : TrustGrant)
(hExtId : g.conditions.hasExternalId = true)
(_hOrg : g.conditions.hasOrgCondition = true) :
wildcardGrant g = false
chain_step_necessary — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Removing a failing step from a chain at threshold breaks it.
theorem chain_step_necessary (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId)
(step : ControlId)
(hMember : step ∈ chain.controls)
(hFailing : step ∈ failing)
(hAtThreshold : failingCount chain failing = chain.threshold) :
¬ chainFires chain (failing.filter (· ≠ step))
partition_complete — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem partition_complete :
Seclib.CrossAccount.Topology
TrustPair — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A service × mechanism × direction triple — one row in the taxonomy. Go source: cross-account-v1.yaml check id.
structure TrustPair where
TrustEdge — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A directed trust edge between two accounts for a specific service. Go source: individual control YAML predicates.
structure TrustEdge where
Topology — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Cross-account trust topology: the graph of inter-account trust grants.
structure Topology where
Topology.hasEdge — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a direct trust edge exists between accounts for a service.
def Topology.hasEdge (t : Topology) (src dst : AccountId) (svc : Service) : Bool
Topology.servicesFrom — ⚪ definition
def · source
All services with edges from a given account.
def Topology.servicesFrom (t : Topology) (acct : AccountId) : List Service
Topology.targetsFor — ⚪ definition
def · source
All accounts a service grants access to from a given account.
def Topology.targetsFor (t : Topology) (acct : AccountId) (svc : Service) : List AccountId
Seclib.CrossAccount.Vertical
kmsGrantChain — ⚪ definition
def · source
KMS grant chain: external-account grantee + no constraint = exploitable. Go source: CTL.KMS.GRANT.EXTERNAL.001. Fixture: internal/fixtures/labs/xa-kms-grants/.
def kmsGrantChain : ChainDef where
s3APChain — ⚪ definition
def · source
S3 access point chain: AP policy grants external + bucket allows AP. Go source: CTL.S3.AP.POLICY.EXTERNAL.001, CTL.S3.AP.CROSSACCOUNT.BUCKET.001. Fixture: internal/fixtures/labs/xa-s3-access-points/.
def s3APChain : ChainDef where
eksAccessChain — ⚪ definition
def · source
EKS access entry chain: external admin + pod identity external. Go source: CTL.EKS.ACCESSENTRY.EXTERNAL.ADMIN.001, CTL.EKS.PODIDENTITY.EXTERNAL.001. Fixture: internal/fixtures/labs/xa-eks-access-entries/.
def eksAccessChain : ChainDef where
oidcClaimChain — ⚪ definition
def · source
OIDC claim scoping chain: unscoped or org-wildcard claim. Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.OIDC.001 + CTL.IAM.TRUST.OIDC.ORGWILDCARD.001. Fixture: internal/fixtures/labs/xa-oidc-claim-scoping/. Uses supply_chain_ingress chain shape.
def oidcClaimChain : ChainDef where
stepNecessary — ⚪ definition
def · source
Step-level decomposition: fixing any one step of a chain breaks it. This is the abstract property — proved in Monotonicity.
def stepNecessary (chain : ChainDef) (failing : List ControlId) (step : ControlId) : Prop
Seclib.Domain.PolicySem
PolicySem — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Vendor-neutral policy evaluation: deny-overrides semantics. All definitions and theorems are parameterized over a PolicySem instance. No cloud provider, ARN, IAM, or vendor-specific concept appears in this module.
structure PolicySem (S R Ctx : Type) where
denyOverrides — ⚪ definition
def · source
def denyOverrides (sem : PolicySem S R Ctx) (stmts : List S) (req : R) (ctx : Ctx) : Bool
removeAllow — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
removeAllow: removing an Allow statement narrows access
theorem removeAllow (sem : PolicySem S R Ctx) (stmts : List S) (i : Nat)
(hi : i < stmts.length) (heff : sem.effect (stmts[i]'hi) = .allow)
(req : R) (ctx : Ctx)
(h : denyOverrides sem (stmts.eraseIdx i) req ctx = true) :
denyOverrides sem stmts req ctx = true
narrow_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
narrow_narrows: replacing a statement with one that matches fewer requests narrows access. Unifies narrowActions and narrowResources.
theorem narrow_narrows (sem : PolicySem S R Ctx)
(stmts : List S) (i : Nat) (hi : i < stmts.length)
(heff : sem.effect (stmts[i]) = .allow)
(new_s : S) (hnew_eff : sem.effect new_s = .allow)
(hnew_cond : ∀ c, sem.condEval c new_s = sem.condEval c (stmts[i]))
(hmono : ∀ req, sem.sat new_s req = true → sem.sat (stmts[i]) req = true)
(req : R) (ctx : Ctx)
(h : denyOverrides sem (stmts.set i new_s) req ctx = true) :
denyOverrides sem stmts req ctx = true
filterMap_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem filterMap_narrows (sem : PolicySem S R Ctx)
(stmts : List S) (f : S → Option S) (req : R) (ctx : Ctx)
(h_deny : ∀ s ∈ stmts, sem.effect s = .deny → f s = some s)
(h_mono : ∀ s s', s ∈ stmts → f s = some s' → sem.effect s = .allow →
nocontext_conservative — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
nocontext_conservative: if allowed under any context, allowed under noCtx
theorem nocontext_conservative (sem : PolicySem S R Ctx)
(stmts : List S) (req : R) (ctx : Ctx)
(h : denyOverrides sem stmts req ctx = true) :
denyOverrides sem stmts req sem.noCtx = true
grants_complete — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
grants_complete: if allowed, an Allow statement exists that matches
theorem grants_complete (sem : PolicySem S R Ctx)
(stmts : List S) (req : R) (ctx : Ctx)
(h : denyOverrides sem stmts req ctx = true) :
Seclib.Ghost
GhostProperty — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure GhostProperty where
[BEq — ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance [BEq α] : BEq (RefStatus α) where
FindingSeverity.toNat — ⚪ definition
def · source
def FindingSeverity.toNat : FindingSeverity → Nat
| .safe => 0
| .low => 1
| .medium => 2
| .high => 3
| .critical => 4
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : LE FindingSeverity where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance (a b : FindingSeverity) : Decidable (a ≤ b)
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : Ord FindingSeverity where
ghostConservative — ⚪ definition
def · source
Conservativeness — the central proof obligation A ghost finding is conservative when for every possible concrete instantiation of the ghost referent, the finding under the ghost assumption is at least as severe as the finding with full information. Any control that produces a finding about a ghost must prove this.
def ghostConservative
(control : α → FindingSeverity)
(_assume : GhostAssumption)
(ghostFinding : FindingSeverity) : Prop
ghostAssumptionsCompatible — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ghostAssumptionsCompatible (a b : GhostAssumption) : Bool
RefStatus.isResolved — ⚪ definition
def · source
Helpers
def RefStatus.isResolved : RefStatus α → Bool
| .resolved _ => true
| .ghost _ _ => false
RefStatus.isGhost — ⚪ definition
def · source
def RefStatus.isGhost : RefStatus α → Bool
| .resolved _ => false
| .ghost _ _ => true
ObsScope — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Observation scope tracking ghost references and their assumptions. Consistency: no contradictory assumptions on the same reference.
structure ObsScope where
ObsScope.empty — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ObsScope.empty : ObsScope
DischargesGhosts — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Scope B discharges A’s ghost assumptions by providing resolved data.
structure DischargesGhosts (resolving : ObsScope) (assumptions : List (String × GhostAssumption)) : Prop where
ghost_contradiction_detected — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Two controls with incompatible ghost assumptions on the same reference cannot coexist in a consistent scope.
theorem ghost_contradiction_detected
{scope : ObsScope} {refId : String} {G₁ G₂ : GhostAssumption}
(h1 : (refId, G₁) ∈ scope.ghostRefs)
(h2 : (refId, G₂) ∈ scope.ghostRefs)
(hContra : ghostAssumptionsCompatible G₁ G₂ = false) :
False
ghost_composition — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
When scope B resolves a ghost from scope A, the conservative finding from A is still valid: for any concrete instantiation, the ghost finding is at least as severe.
theorem ghost_composition
{α : Type} {scopeA scopeB : ObsScope}
{control : α → FindingSeverity}
{ga : GhostAssumption} {ghostFinding : FindingSeverity}
{refId : String}
(_hGhostInA : (refId, ga) ∈ scopeA.ghostRefs)
(_hConservative : ghostConservative control ga ghostFinding)
(_hDischarge : DischargesGhosts scopeB [(refId, ga)]) :
Seclib.Ghost.Datalog
ghostPropertyToDatalog — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ghostPropertyToDatalog (id : String) (p : GhostProperty) : String
ghostAssumptionToDatalog — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ghostAssumptionToDatalog (id : String) (assume : GhostAssumption) : String
refStatusToDatalog — ⚪ definition
def · source
def refStatusToDatalog [ToString α] (id : String) (ref : RefStatus α) : String
Seclib.Ghost.SMT
ghostPropertyToSMT — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ghostPropertyToSMT (id : String) (p : GhostProperty) : String
ghostAssumptionToSMT — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ghostAssumptionToSMT (id : String) (assume : GhostAssumption) : String
refStatusToSMT — ⚪ definition
def · source
def refStatusToSMT [ToString α] (id : String) (ref : RefStatus α) : String
Seclib.IAM.Barrier
barrierBlocks — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a barrier blocks the escalation path from principal to target action. Go source: fixture partial semantics.
def barrierBlocks (g : IAMGraph) (principalId targetAction : String) : Barrier → Bool
| .mfa =>
pathBlocked — ⚪ definition
def · source
An escalation path is blocked if any barrier applies. Go source: partial fixture semantics — partial fires atomic but not chain.
def pathBlocked (g : IAMGraph) (principalId targetAction : String) (barrier : Barrier) : Prop
partialFinding — ⚪ definition
def · source
A partial finding: the escalation path exists but a barrier blocks it. Distance is ≥ 1 (one-away, not exploitable). Go source: fixture partial scenarios.
def partialFinding (g : IAMGraph) (principalId targetAction : String) (barrier : Barrier) : Prop
Seclib.IAM.Bridge
BridgeRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A bridge test record.
structure BridgeRecord where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : FromJson BridgeRecord where
parseScenario — ⚪ definition
def · source
Parse an escalation scenario name to the enum.
def parseScenario : String → Option EscalationScenario
| "addUserToGroup" => some .addUserToGroup
| "attachRolePolicy" => some .attachRolePolicy
| "attachGroupPolicy" => some .attachGroupPolicy
| "attachUserPolicy" => some .attachUserPolicy
| "putGroupPolicy" => some .putGroupPolicy
| "putRolePolicy" => some .putRolePolicy
| "putUserPolicy" => some .putUserPolicy
| "createLoginProfile" => some .createLoginProfile
| "updateLoginProfile" => some .updateLoginProfile
| "createPolicyVersion" => some .createPolicyVersion
| _ => none
BridgeRecord.toGraph — ⚪ definition
def · source
Build an IAMGraph from a bridge record’s edges, actions, and conditions.
def BridgeRecord.toGraph (r : BridgeRecord) : IAMGraph where
checkRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
Check one bridge record: compare actual vs expected distance.
def checkRecord (r : BridgeRecord) : Bool × String
parseJsonl — ⚪ definition
def · source
Parse JSONL into bridge records.
def parseJsonl (content : String) : List BridgeRecord
bridgeCheck — ⚪ definition
def · source
Check all records via IO, printing results.
def bridgeCheck (path : System.FilePath) : IO UInt32
Seclib.IAM.BridgeMain
main — ⚪ definition
def · source
def main (args : List String) : IO UInt32
Seclib.IAM.Disclosure
allExcludedIAMLayers — ⚪ definition
def · source
All excluded layers.
def allExcludedIAMLayers : List ExcludedIAMLayer
AbstractReachabilityOnly — ⚪ definition
structure · source
The formalization is sound over the abstract reachability model. Type-level marker — proofs about IAM reachability carry these assumptions.
structure AbstractReachabilityOnly where
Seclib.IAM.Distance
EscalationScenario.primaryAction — ⚪ definition
def · source
The primary IAM action for each escalation scenario. Go source: escalation control YAML (unsafe_predicate fields).
def EscalationScenario.primaryAction : EscalationScenario → String
| .addUserToGroup => "iam:AddUserToGroup"
| .attachRolePolicy => "iam:AttachRolePolicy"
| .attachGroupPolicy => "iam:AttachGroupPolicy"
| .attachUserPolicy => "iam:AttachUserPolicy"
| .putGroupPolicy => "iam:PutGroupPolicy"
| .putRolePolicy => "iam:PutRolePolicy"
| .putUserPolicy => "iam:PutUserPolicy"
| .createLoginProfile => "iam:CreateLoginProfile"
| .updateLoginProfile => "iam:UpdateLoginProfile"
| .createPolicyVersion => "iam:CreatePolicyVersion"
escalationDistance — ⚪ definition
def · source
Escalation distance: 0 = exploitable, ≥ 1 = one or more barriers. Reuses Compose’s chainDistance concept. Go source: finding_risk.go:11-24.
def escalationDistance (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) (scenario : EscalationScenario) : Nat
classifyEscalation — ⚪ definition
def · source
Classify escalation exploitability using Compose’s Exploitability type. Go source: finding_risk.go:11-24.
def classifyEscalation (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) (scenario : EscalationScenario) : Exploitability
Seclib.IAM.Graph
TrustCondition — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A trust condition on a role’s trust policy that gates assumption. Soufflé source: schema.dl:138 (has_trust_condition).
structure TrustCondition where
ExternalTrust — ⚪ definition
structure · source
An external trust edge from a federation source to an IAM role. Soufflé source: federation.dl:59-65 (external_reach).
structure ExternalTrust where
IAMGraph — ⚪ definition
structure · source
The IAM privilege graph. Fields correspond to Soufflé input relations. Soufflé source: schema.dl (input relations), rules.dl (join structure).
structure IAMGraph where
IAMGraph.hasEdge — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a direct assumption edge exists. Soufflé source: rules.dl:64 (base case of transitive_assume).
def IAMGraph.hasEdge (g : IAMGraph) (src dst : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.hasCondition — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a role has a trust condition gate. Soufflé source: schema.dl:138 / rules.dl:81.
def IAMGraph.hasCondition (g : IAMGraph) (roleId : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.directActions — ⚪ definition
def · source
Actions directly held by a principal. Soufflé source: schema.dl:67 (has_action).
def IAMGraph.directActions (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : List String
IAMGraph.directResources — ⚪ definition
def · source
Resources directly held by a principal. Soufflé source: schema.dl:69 (has_resource).
def IAMGraph.directResources (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : List String
IAMGraph.directDenyActions — ⚪ definition
def · source
Deny actions directly held by a principal. Soufflé source: schema.dl:72 (has_deny_action).
def IAMGraph.directDenyActions (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : List String
IAMGraph.permBoundary — ⚪ definition
def · source
Permission boundary actions for a principal. Soufflé source: schema.dl:78 (has_permission_action).
def IAMGraph.permBoundary (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : List String
IAMGraph.hasPermBoundary — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a principal has any permission boundary. Go source: CTL.IAM.BOUNDARY.MISSING.001 semantics.
def IAMGraph.hasPermBoundary (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.scpDenies — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a principal has an SCP deny for an action. Boolean SCP model — known limitation (see Disclosure).
def IAMGraph.scpDenies (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) (action : String) : Bool
Seclib.IAM.Monotonicity
priv_transitive — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
If A can reach B and B can reach C, then A can reach C. Soufflé source: rules.dl:61-65 (transitive_assume recursive rule).
theorem priv_transitive (g : IAMGraph) (a b c : String)
(hab : PrivReachable g a b) (hbc : PrivReachable g b c) :
PrivReachable g a c
barrier_demotes — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
A blocked escalation path is not distance-0 (not exploitable). Barriers demote exploitable → one-away. Go source: fixture partial semantics.
theorem barrier_demotes (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String)
(scenario : EscalationScenario)
(hPath : g.escalationPath principalId scenario.primaryAction = true)
(barrier : Barrier)
(hBlocked : barrierBlocks g principalId scenario.primaryAction barrier = true) :
escalationDistance g principalId scenario ≥ 1
scp_deny_monotone — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Adding an SCP deny statement to a graph that has no escalation path cannot create one. SCPs only restrict, never grant. Soufflé source: rules.dl:190-192 (effective_permission = allow AND NOT deny).
theorem scp_deny_monotone (g : IAMGraph) (principalId action : String)
(stmt : String × String)
(hNo : g.escalationPath principalId action = false) :
perm_boundary_monotone — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Adding a permission boundary action to a graph that has no escalation path cannot create one. Go source: CTL.IAM.BOUNDARY controls.
theorem perm_boundary_monotone (g : IAMGraph) (principalId action : String)
(entry : String × String)
(hNo : g.escalationPath principalId action = false) :
iam_exploitable_matches_compose — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
An exploitable IAM escalation maps to Compose’s .exploitable classification. Go source: finding_risk.go:11-24 (Exploitability).
theorem iam_exploitable_matches_compose (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String)
(scenario : EscalationScenario)
(h : escalationDistance g principalId scenario = 0) :
classifyEscalation g principalId scenario = .exploitable
iam_oneaway_matches_compose — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
A one-away IAM escalation maps to Compose’s .oneAway classification.
theorem iam_oneaway_matches_compose (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String)
(scenario : EscalationScenario)
(h : escalationDistance g principalId scenario = 1) :
classifyEscalation g principalId scenario = .oneAway
Seclib.IAM.Principal
Principal — ⚪ definition
structure · source
An IAM principal. Soufflé source: schema.dl:57 (has_type → principal_type).
structure Principal where
Seclib.IAM.Reachability
IAMGraph.transitiveAssume — ⚪ definition
def · source
Bounded transitive assumption closure. Computes the fixpoint of can_assume up to
fuelsteps (prevents nontermination in Lean). Soufflé source: rules.dl:61-65.
def IAMGraph.transitiveAssume (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) (fuel : Nat
IAMGraph.unconditionalAssume — ⚪ definition
def · source
Bounded unconditional assumption closure: only edges where the target role has no trust condition gate (MFA, ExternalId, etc.). Soufflé source: rules.dl:78-82.
def IAMGraph.unconditionalAssume (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) (fuel : Nat
IAMGraph.reachableActions — ⚪ definition
def · source
Actions reachable by a principal (direct + via assumption chains). Soufflé source: rules.dl:93-97 (reachable_action).
def IAMGraph.reachableActions (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : List String
IAMGraph.reachableResources — ⚪ definition
def · source
Resources reachable by a principal. Soufflé source: rules.dl:99-103 (reachable_resource).
def IAMGraph.reachableResources (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : List String
IAMGraph.reachableDenyActions — ⚪ definition
def · source
Deny actions reachable by a principal. Soufflé source: rules.dl:109-113 (reachable_deny_action).
def IAMGraph.reachableDenyActions (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) : List String
IAMGraph.effectivePermission — ⚪ definition
def · source
Effective permission: allow minus deny. Soufflé source: rules.dl:190-192 (effective_permission). Simplified: omits scope-aware joins (those eliminate cross-account Cartesian false positives but don’t affect the formal properties).
def IAMGraph.effectivePermission (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) (action resource : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.effectiveAccess — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether principal can perform action on resource (abstract ARN matching). Soufflé source: rules.dl:245-250 (effective_access). Uses exact string match — real Soufflé uses arn_matches with wildcards.
def IAMGraph.effectiveAccess (g : IAMGraph) (principalId resource action : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.escalationPath — ⚪ definition
def · source
Escalation path: principal can reach actions it doesn’t directly hold, via assumption chains. This is the core IAM privilege escalation concept. Soufflé source: transitive_assume + reachable_action composition.
def IAMGraph.escalationPath (g : IAMGraph) (principalId : String) (targetAction : String) : Bool
EscalationPath — ⚪ definition
def · source
Escalation path as a Prop. “Principal can reach an action it doesn’t directly hold.”
def EscalationPath (g : IAMGraph) (principalId targetAction : String) : Prop
Seclib.IAM.TrustBoundary
IAMGraph.crossAccountTrust — ⚪ definition
def · source
Cross-account trust: principal in one account can assume a role in another account. Soufflé source: schema.dl:98 (cross_account_assumes).
def IAMGraph.crossAccountTrust (g : IAMGraph) (principalId roleId : String) : Prop
IAMGraph.wildcardPrincipal — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a trust policy has a wildcard principal (*). Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.WILDCARD.001 semantics.
def IAMGraph.wildcardPrincipal (g : IAMGraph) (roleId : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.externalIdRequired — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a role requires ExternalId in its trust policy. Soufflé source: schema.dl:138 (has_trust_condition, condition_key contains “external”). Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.CONFUSEDDEPUTY.001 semantics.
def IAMGraph.externalIdRequired (g : IAMGraph) (roleId : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.orgBoundaryRespected — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a role’s trust policy respects organization boundary. Go source: CTL.IAM.TRUST.ORGBOUNDARY.001 semantics. True if all trusting principals are in the same org (modeled as account prefix match — simplified from real aws:PrincipalOrgID).
def IAMGraph.orgBoundaryRespected (g : IAMGraph) (roleId orgPrefix : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.externalReaches — ⚪ definition
def · source
External reachability: can an external source reach a resource through the IAM graph? Soufflé source: federation.dl:90-110 (external_transitive_reach).
def IAMGraph.externalReaches (g : IAMGraph) (source : String) (resource : String) : Bool
IAMGraph.unrestrictedExternalReach — ⚪ definition
def · source
Unrestricted external reach: external source reaches resource via at least one unrestricted hop. Soufflé source: federation.dl:120-129 (unrestricted_external_reach).
def IAMGraph.unrestrictedExternalReach (g : IAMGraph) (source resource : String) : Bool
Seclib.Network.Bridge
BridgeRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A bridge record from the Go test suite.
structure BridgeRecord where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : FromJson BridgeRecord where
parseVerdict — ⚪ definition
def · source
Parse a verdict string to our Verdict type.
def parseVerdict (s : String) : Option Verdict
checkRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
Check structural consistency of a bridge record.
def checkRecord (r : BridgeRecord) : Option String
checkAll — ⚪ definition
def · source
Check all bridge records.
def checkAll (records : List BridgeRecord) : IO UInt32
parseJsonl — ⚪ definition
def · source
Parse JSONL into bridge records.
def parseJsonl (content : String) : List BridgeRecord
bridgeCheck — ⚪ definition
def · source
Main entry point.
def bridgeCheck (path : System.FilePath) : IO UInt32
Seclib.Network.BridgeMain
main — ⚪ definition
def · source
CLI wrapper for the network bridge checker. Go source: bridge.jsonl produced from Go test expectations.
def main (args : List String) : IO UInt32
Seclib.Network.Disclosure
allExcludedLayers — ⚪ definition
def · source
All excluded layers. Go source: proof.go:468-472
def allExcludedLayers : List ExcludedLayer
SgIngressOnly — ⚪ definition
structure · source
UNSAT is sound over the SG-ingress-only model. Type-level marker. Go source: proof.go:468-472 (sound-over-SG-ingress disclaimer)
structure SgIngressOnly where
Seclib.Network.Graph
Host — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Host classification tags. Go source: graph.go:10-24
structure Host where
Host.isProduction — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:20
def Host.isProduction (h : Host) : Bool
Host.isBastion — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:21
def Host.isBastion (h : Host) : Bool
Host.isDevelopment — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:22
def Host.isDevelopment (h : Host) : Bool
Host.isDatabaseTier — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:23
def Host.isDatabaseTier (h : Host) : Bool
Host.isIsolated — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:24
def Host.isIsolated (h : Host) : Bool
SGRule — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Go source: graph.go:27-33
structure SGRule where
VPCPeering — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Go source: graph.go:36-40
structure VPCPeering where
Subnet — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Go source: graph.go:43-48
structure Subnet where
Subnet.isPrivate — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:51
def Subnet.isPrivate (s : Subnet) : Bool
Route — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Go source: graph.go:54-58
structure Route where
classifyRoute — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: proof.go:439-456
def classifyRoute (targetType : String) : RouteClass
broadCIDRs — ⚪ definition
def · source
RFC1918 + internet CIDRs treated as broad. Go source: reachability.go:17-23
def broadCIDRs : List String
NetGraph — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Go source: graph.go:68-76
structure NetGraph where
NetGraph.productionHosts — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:198-206
def NetGraph.productionHosts (g : NetGraph) : List Host
NetGraph.bastionHosts — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:209-217
def NetGraph.bastionHosts (g : NetGraph) : List Host
NetGraph.developmentHosts — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:220-228
def NetGraph.developmentHosts (g : NetGraph) : List Host
NetGraph.databaseHosts — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:231-239
def NetGraph.databaseHosts (g : NetGraph) : List Host
NetGraph.isolatedHosts — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:242-250
def NetGraph.isolatedHosts (g : NetGraph) : List Host
NetGraph.privateSubnets — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: graph.go:253-261
def NetGraph.privateSubnets (g : NetGraph) : List Subnet
NetGraph.rulesFor — ⚪ definition
def · source
Look up SG rules by SG ID. Go source: graph.go:68-76 (Graph.SGRules map access)
def NetGraph.rulesFor (g : NetGraph) (sgId : String) : List SGRule
NetGraph.routesFor — ⚪ definition
def · source
Look up routes by route table ID. Go source: graph.go:68-76 (Graph.Routes map access)
def NetGraph.routesFor (g : NetGraph) (rtId : String) : List Route
NetGraph.findSubnet — ⚪ definition
def · source
Find subnet by ID. Go source: graph.go:68-76 (Graph.Subnets map access)
def NetGraph.findSubnet (g : NetGraph) (subnetId : String) : Option Subnet
Seclib.Network.Monotonicity
List.any_of_any_append_left — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
If
anyholds on a list, it holds on a superset (append). Go source: reachability.go — CanReach uses List.any; this is the abstract monotonicity principle underlying edge_monotone.
theorem List.any_of_any_append_left {l₁ l₂ : List α} {p : α → Bool}
(h : l₁.any p = true) : (l₁ ++ l₂).any p = true
rule_check_mono — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Abstract monotonicity: if a predicate holds when checking
anyover a set of rules, it still holds over a superset. Go source: reachability.go:36-51 — core of edge_monotone.
theorem rule_check_mono {rules extra : List SGRule}
{check : SGRule → Bool}
(h : rules.any check = true) :
(rules ++ extra).any check = true
canReach_mono_abstract — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
If membership is preserved,
anyis preserved. Go source: reachability.go:36-51 The key invariant: adding an SG rule to a graph that already allows reachability cannot remove that reachability.
theorem canReach_mono_abstract
(sgRules₁ sgRules₂ : String → List SGRule)
(h_super : ∀ sg, ∀ r, r ∈ sgRules₁ sg → r ∈ sgRules₂ sg)
(sgIds : List String) (check : SGRule → Bool)
(h : sgIds.any (fun sg => (sgRules₁ sg).any check) = true) :
sgIds.any (fun sg => (sgRules₂ sg).any check) = true
isolation_sound — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
If a host is tagged isolated and no host in the graph can reach it on any port (UNSAT), then canReachAny is false for all sources. Go source: graph.go:24 (IsIsolated), proof.go:588 (UNSAT)
theorem isolation_sound (g : NetGraph) (dst : Host)
(_hIso : dst.isIsolated = true)
(hUnsat : ∀ src, src ∈ g.hosts → g.canReachAny src dst = false) :
∀ src, src ∈ g.hosts → ¬ ReachableAny g src dst
hasGatedEgressPath — ⚪ definition
def · source
A graph has a gated egress path if an isolated host can reach a host whose subnet routes to a gated target. Go source: proof.go:560-584 (EVIDENCE_GATED condition)
def hasGatedEgressPath (g : NetGraph) : Prop
gated_not_unsat — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
If a gated egress path exists and no sink path exists, transitiveEgressVerdict returns evidenceGated, never unsat. Go source: proof.go:465 verdict precedence.
theorem gated_not_unsat (g : NetGraph)
(hGated : g.isolatedHosts.any (fun iso =>
unsat_no_gated — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Contrapositive: if verdict is UNSAT, no gated path exists. Go source: proof.go:465 (verdict precedence).
theorem unsat_no_gated (g : NetGraph)
(h : transitiveEgressVerdict g = .unsat) :
transitiveEgress_decomposition — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Transitive egress decomposes into two reachability queries: (1) isolated → service, (2) service has egress route. This is definitionally true from
transitiveEgressSat. Go source: proof.go:532-557 (SAT check: canReachAnyPort then route classification).
theorem transitiveEgress_decomposition (g : NetGraph) :
Seclib.Network.Property
bastionSsh — ⚪ definition
def · source
All SSH paths to production traverse a bastion host. Go source: proof.go:53-118
def bastionSsh (g : NetGraph) (port : Nat) : Prop
prodDevIsolation — ⚪ definition
def · source
No network path between production and development environments. Go source: proof.go:167-217
def prodDevIsolation (g : NetGraph) : Prop
databaseIsolation — ⚪ definition
def · source
No host outside the database VPC can reach a database host. Go source: proof.go:222-290
def databaseIsolation (g : NetGraph) : Prop
transitiveSsh — ⚪ definition
def · source
No non-bastion relay can bridge SSH to production (two-hop). Go source: proof.go:295-374
def transitiveSsh (g : NetGraph) (port : Nat) : Prop
firewallMandatory — ⚪ definition
def · source
All private subnets route internet traffic through a firewall endpoint. Go source: proof.go:379-425
def firewallMandatory (g : NetGraph) : Prop
hostEgressClass — ⚪ definition
def · source
Egress classification for a host: whether its subnet has a default route to a sink, gated target, or neither. Go source: proof.go:490-522 (egress candidate classification)
def hostEgressClass (g : NetGraph) (h : Host) : Option RouteClass
transitiveEgressSat — ⚪ definition
def · source
Transitive egress SAT condition: isolated host reaches a sink. Go source: proof.go:532-557
def transitiveEgressSat (g : NetGraph) : Prop
transitiveEgressGated — ⚪ definition
def · source
Transitive egress EVIDENCE_GATED condition: isolated host reaches a gated target. Go source: proof.go:560-584
def transitiveEgressGated (g : NetGraph) : Prop
transitiveEgressVerdict — ⚪ definition
def · source
Full transitive-egress verdict with precedence: SAT > GATED > UNSAT. Go source: proof.go:465
def transitiveEgressVerdict (g : NetGraph) : Verdict
Seclib.Network.Reachability
NetGraph.vpcsConnected — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether two VPCs are connected via peering or transit gateway. Go source: reachability.go:80-88, graph.go:323-343
def NetGraph.vpcsConnected (g : NetGraph) (vpc1 vpc2 : String) : Bool
cidrCovers — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether a CIDR covers a host (same-VPC + broad CIDR). Go source: reachability.go:73-78
def cidrCovers (cidr : String) (src dst : Host) : Bool
ruleAllows — ⚪ definition
def · source
Check if a single ingress rule allows src to reach dst on a given port. Go source: reachability.go:37-50 (inner loop)
def ruleAllows (rule : SGRule) (src dst : Host) (port : Nat) : Bool
NetGraph.canReachSameVpc — ⚪ definition
def · source
Same-VPC reachability via SG ingress rules on a specific port. Go source: reachability.go:36-51
def NetGraph.canReachSameVpc (g : NetGraph) (src dst : Host) (port : Nat) : Bool
NetGraph.canReachCrossVpc — ⚪ definition
def · source
Cross-VPC reachability: peered/TGW-connected VPCs with broad CIDR ingress. Go source: reachability.go:54-68
def NetGraph.canReachCrossVpc (g : NetGraph) (src dst : Host) (port : Nat) : Bool
NetGraph.canReach — ⚪ definition
def · source
Full reachability: same-VPC or cross-VPC. Go source: reachability.go:26-71
def NetGraph.canReach (g : NetGraph) (src dst : Host) (port : Nat) : Bool
NetGraph.canReachAny — ⚪ definition
def · source
Any-port reachability: returns whether src can reach dst on any port. Go source: reachability.go:138-182
def NetGraph.canReachAny (g : NetGraph) (src dst : Host) : Bool
NetGraph.hasExternalIngress — ⚪ definition
def · source
Whether dst has external SSH ingress (0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0). Go source: proof.go:120-142
def NetGraph.hasExternalIngress (g : NetGraph) (dst : Host) (port : Nat) : Bool
Reachable — ⚪ definition
def · source
Reachability as a Prop (for proofs). Go source: reachability.go:26-71 (CanReach, lifted to Prop)
def Reachable (g : NetGraph) (src dst : Host) (port : Nat) : Prop
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance (g : NetGraph) (src dst : Host) (port : Nat) :
ReachableAny — ⚪ definition
def · source
Any-port reachability as a Prop. Go source: reachability.go:138-182 (canReachAnyPort, lifted to Prop)
def ReachableAny (g : NetGraph) (src dst : Host) : Prop
Seclib.Network.Verdict
Verdict.rank — ⚪ definition
def · source
Verdict severity rank (lower = worse). Go source: proof.go:465 “SAT > EVIDENCE_GATED > UNSAT”
def Verdict.rank : Verdict → Nat
| .sat => 0
| .evidenceGated => 1
| .unsat => 2
Counterexample — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Counterexample witness for a SAT or EVIDENCE_GATED verdict. Go source: proof.go:24-33
structure Counterexample where
ProofResult — ⚪ definition
structure · source
A proof result pairs a verdict with an optional counterexample. Go source: proof.go:11-21
structure ProofResult where
Seclib.Prim
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToString Tri where
Seclib.Prim.Context
Request — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Vendor-neutral authorization request and evaluation context. No cloud provider noun appears in this module.
structure Request where
CondContext — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CondContext where
mkContext — ⚪ definition
def · source
def mkContext (j : Json) : Except String CondContext
CondContext.lookup — ⚪ definition
def · source
def CondContext.lookup (ctx : CondContext) (key : String) : Option Json
Seclib.Prim.Finding
Severity.toString — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Severity.toString : Severity → String
| .critical => "critical"
| .high => "high"
| .medium => "medium"
| .low => "low"
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToString Severity
Evidence — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Evidence where
Fix — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Fix where
Finding — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Finding where
Seclib.Prim.Glob
toLowerStr — ⚪ definition
def · source
Vendor-neutral case folding, glob pattern matching, and string lemmas. No cloud provider noun appears in this module.
def toLowerStr (s : String) : String
matchPatternGo — ⚪ definition
def · source
def matchPatternGo (ps vs : List Char) : Bool
matchPattern — ⚪ definition
def · source
def matchPattern (pattern : String) (value : String) : Bool
ciEq — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ciEq (s₁ s₂ : String) : Bool
ciEq_toLowerStr — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem ciEq_toLowerStr (s s' : String) (h : ciEq s s' = true) :
toLowerStr s = toLowerStr s'
matchPatternGo_literal_eq — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem matchPatternGo_literal_eq (ps vs : List Char)
(hno_star : '*' ∉ ps) (hno_q : '?' ∉ ps)
(h : matchPatternGo ps vs = true) :
ps = vs
matchPattern_literal_mp — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem matchPattern_literal_mp (p s : String)
(hno_star : '*' ∉ p.toList) (hno_q : '?' ∉ p.toList)
(h : matchPattern p s = true) :
ciEq p s = true
matchPattern_cs_literal_eq — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem matchPattern_cs_literal_eq (p s : String)
(hno_star : '*' ∉ p.toList) (hno_q : '?' ∉ p.toList)
(h : matchPattern p s = true) : p = s
toLower_eq_star — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem toLower_eq_star (c : Char) (h : c.toLower = '*') : c = '*'
toLower_eq_question — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem toLower_eq_question (c : Char) (h : c.toLower = '?') : c = '?'
Seclib.Prim.Rule
Rule — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Vendor-neutral authorization primitives: Rule, appliesOf, denyOverrides. No cloud provider noun appears in this module.
structure Rule where
denyOverridesRules — ⚪ definition
def · source
def denyOverridesRules (rules : List Rule) : Bool
denyOverrides_remove_allow_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Lemma 1: Removing an allow rule narrows access
theorem denyOverrides_remove_allow_narrows (rules : List Rule) (i : Nat)
(hi : i < rules.length) (hallow : (rules[i]).decision = .allow)
(h : denyOverridesRules (rules.eraseIdx i) = true) :
denyOverridesRules rules = true
denyOverrides_add_deny_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Lemma 2: Adding a deny narrows
theorem denyOverrides_add_deny_narrows (rules : List Rule) (i : Nat)
(hi : i < rules.length) (hdeny : (rules[i]).decision = .deny)
(h : denyOverridesRules rules = true) :
denyOverridesRules (rules.eraseIdx i) = true
conj_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Lemma 3: Conjunction of evaluation gates never widens access
theorem conj_narrows (a b : Bool) (h : a && b = true) : a = true ∧ b = true
appliesOf_unknown_conservative — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Lemma 4: Unknown applicability is conservative
theorem appliesOf_unknown_conservative (rules rules_noCtx : List Rule)
(hlen : rules.length = rules_noCtx.length)
(hpair : ∀ j (hj : j < rules.length),
(rules_noCtx[j]'(hlen ▸ hj)).decision = (rules[j]).decision ∧
(rules_noCtx[j]'(hlen ▸ hj)).sat = (rules[j]).sat ∧
((rules_noCtx[j]'(hlen ▸ hj)).applicability = .t ∨
(rules_noCtx[j]'(hlen ▸ hj)).applicability = .u) ∧
((rules_noCtx[j]'(hlen ▸ hj)).applicability = .t →
(rules[j]).applicability = .t))
(h : denyOverridesRules rules = true) :
denyOverridesRules rules_noCtx = true
Seclib.Schema.Bridge
CatalogSummaryRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
Contract test bridge for the CEL predicate type system. Parses JSONL records exported by lean-celtype-bridge, validates structural properties of the catalog, contract, and capability vocabulary. Four record kinds: catalog_summary: aggregate counts control: per-control identity + field paths contract_field: per-field from collector-contract.yaml capability: per-capability with chain reference count
structure CatalogSummaryRecord where
ControlRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure ControlRecord where
ContractFieldRecord — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure ContractFieldRecord where
CapabilityRec — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CapabilityRec where
parseSeverity — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseSeverity : String → Option Severity
| "info" => some .info
| "low" => some .low
| "medium" => some .medium
| "high" => some .high
| "critical" => some .critical
| _ => none
parseControlType — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseControlType : String → Option ControlType
| "unsafe_state" => some .unsafeState
| "unsafe_duration" => some .unsafeDuration
| "unsafe_recurrence" => some .unsafeRecurrence
| "prefix_exposure" => some .prefixExposure
| "marker" => some .marker
| _ => none
parseClassification — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseClassification : String → Option Classification
| "state_assertion" => some .stateAssertion
| "parameterized_check" => some .parameterizedCheck
| "absence_check" => some .absenceCheck
| "aggregate_check" => some .aggregateCheck
| _ => none
parseFieldType — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseFieldType : String → Option FieldType
| "boolean" => some .boolean
| "string" => some .string
| "integer" => some .integer
| "number" => some .number
| "list" => some .list
| "object" => some .object
| _ => none
parseOperator — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseOperator : String → Option Operator
| "eq" => some .eq
| "ne" => some .ne
| "gt" => some .gt
| "lt" => some .lt
| "gte" => some .gte
| "lte" => some .lte
| "missing" => some .missing
| "present" => some .present
| "in" => some .in
| "list_empty" => some .listEmpty
| "not_subset_of_field" => some .notSubsetOfField
| "neq_field" => some .neqField
| "not_in_field" => some .notInField
| "contains" => some .contains
| "any_match" => some .anyMatch
| "any_identity_match" => some .anyIdentityMatch
| "any_in_field" => some .anyInField
| _ => none
getJsonStringArray — ⚪ definition
def · source
def getJsonStringArray (j : Json) (key : String) : List String
parseCatalogSummary — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseCatalogSummary (j : Json) : Except String CatalogSummaryRecord
parseControlRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseControlRecord (j : Json) : Except String ControlRecord
parseContractFieldRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseContractFieldRecord (j : Json) : Except String ContractFieldRecord
parseCapabilityRec — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseCapabilityRec (j : Json) : Except String CapabilityRec
checkCatalogSummary — ⚪ definition
def · source
Checks
def checkCatalogSummary (r : CatalogSummaryRecord) : Bool × String
checkControlRecord — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkControlRecord (r : ControlRecord) : Bool × String
checkContractField — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkContractField (r : ContractFieldRecord) : Bool × String
checkCapability — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkCapability (r : CapabilityRec) : Bool × String
bridgeCheck — ⚪ definition
def · source
Main bridge check
def bridgeCheck (path : System.FilePath) : IO UInt32
Seclib.Schema.BridgeMain
main — ⚪ definition
def · source
def main (args : List String) : IO UInt32
Seclib.Schema.Capability
builtinCapabilities — ⚪ definition
def · source
The 99 builtin capability strings from the catalog. Go source: internal/core/capabilities/capabilities.go:20-99 Sorted alphabetically for review-diff stability.
def builtinCapabilities : List Capability
isValidCapability — ⚪ definition
def · source
def isValidCapability (cap : Capability) : Bool
builtinCapabilities_length — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem builtinCapabilities_length : builtinCapabilities.length = 78
Seclib.Schema.Contract
ContractField — ⚪ definition
structure · source
ContractField — one entry in the collector contract
structure ContractField where
Contract.fieldPaths — ⚪ definition
def · source
Contract queries
def Contract.fieldPaths (c : Contract) : List String
Contract.consumersOf — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Contract.consumersOf (c : Contract) (path : String) : List ControlId
Contract.fieldsForControl — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Contract.fieldsForControl (c : Contract) (id : ControlId) : List ContractField
Contract.hasField — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Contract.hasField (c : Contract) (path : String) : Bool
predicateConsistentWithContract — ⚪ definition
def · source
Schema-predicate consistency check A predicate is contract-consistent when every field path it references (after stripping the “properties.” prefix) appears in the contract.
def predicateConsistentWithContract (pred : UnsafePredicate) (contract : Contract) : Bool
Seclib.Schema.Control
ControlDef — ⚪ definition
structure · source
ControlDef — projected control definition Go source: internal/core/controldef/definition.go:32-133
structure ControlDef where
ControlDef.requiresCELValidation — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ControlDef.requiresCELValidation (c : ControlDef) : Bool
ControlDef.isEvaluatable — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ControlDef.isEvaluatable (c : ControlDef) : Bool
ControlDef.appliesToAssetType — ⚪ definition
def · source
Go source: definition.go:281-286. Empty applicable list = applies to all asset types.
def ControlDef.appliesToAssetType (c : ControlDef) (at_ : AssetType) : Bool
ControlDef.predicateFieldPaths — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ControlDef.predicateFieldPaths (c : ControlDef) : List FieldPath
Catalog.controlIds — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Catalog.controlIds (cat : Catalog) : List ControlId
Catalog.assetTypes — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Catalog.assetTypes (cat : Catalog) : List AssetType
Catalog.findById — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Catalog.findById (cat : Catalog) (id : ControlId) : Option ControlDef
Catalog.controlsForAssetType — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Catalog.controlsForAssetType (cat : Catalog) (at_ : AssetType) : List ControlDef
Seclib.Schema.Predicate
UnsafePredicate — ⚪ definition
structure · source
UnsafePredicate — top-level predicate container Go source: internal/core/controldef/predicate.go:9-14
structure UnsafePredicate where
UnsafePredicate.isEmpty — ⚪ definition
def · source
def UnsafePredicate.isEmpty (p : UnsafePredicate) : Bool
UnsafePredicate.fieldPaths — ⚪ definition
def · source
def UnsafePredicate.fieldPaths (p : UnsafePredicate) : List FieldPath
UnsafePredicate.operators — ⚪ definition
def · source
def UnsafePredicate.operators (p : UnsafePredicate) : List Operator
Seclib.Schema.Properties
fieldPath_strip_properties_cons — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Theorem 1: Schema-predicate consistency Every field path in a predicate that starts with “properties.” can be stripped to produce a contract-queryable path. (Full cross-reference is bridge-tested via JSONL.)
theorem fieldPath_strip_properties_cons (rest : List String)
(h : ("properties" :: rest).length > 0
missing_no_value — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Theorem 2: Null safety Operators
missing,present, andlist_emptydo not require a comparison value. All other operators do.
theorem missing_no_value : Operator.missing.requiresValue = false
present_no_value — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem present_no_value : Operator.present.requiresValue = false
list_empty_no_value — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem list_empty_no_value : Operator.listEmpty.requiresValue = false
eq_requires_value — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem eq_requires_value : Operator.eq.requiresValue = true
ne_requires_value — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem ne_requires_value : Operator.ne.requiresValue = true
contains_requires_value — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem contains_requires_value : Operator.contains.requiresValue = true
null_safety_complete — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem null_safety_complete :
appliesToAssetType_empty_means_all — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Theorem 3: Catalog-schema coupling For every control in a catalog, if it declares no applicable asset types, appliesToAssetType returns true for any type. If it declares types, membership determines the result.
theorem appliesToAssetType_empty_means_all
(c : ControlDef) (at_ : AssetType)
(h : c.applicableAssetTypes = []) :
c.appliesToAssetType at_ = true
appliesToAssetType_contains — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem appliesToAssetType_contains
(c : ControlDef) (at_ : AssetType)
(h : at_ ∈ c.applicableAssetTypes) :
c.appliesToAssetType at_ = true
embed_set_equality — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Theorem 4: Embed invariant If two sorted lists of control IDs are equal, they contain the same elements (set equality from list equality).
theorem embed_set_equality
{ids₁ ids₂ : List ControlId}
(h : ids₁ = ids₂) :
∀ id, id ∈ ids₁ ↔ id ∈ ids₂
builtin_nonempty — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Theorem 5: Capability liveness Every capability in the builtin set is a string. The bridge checker verifies each capability is referenced by ≥1 chain via JSONL. Here we prove the vocabulary is non-empty and closed.
theorem builtin_nonempty : builtinCapabilities.length > 0
capability_membership — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem capability_membership (cap : String) :
isValidCapability cap = true ↔ cap ∈ builtinCapabilities
allOperators — ⚪ definition
def · source
Theorem 6: Coverage bridge — operator set is closed The Lean Operator type has exactly 17 constructors, matching the Go IsSupported switch.
def allOperators : List Operator
operator_count — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem operator_count : allOperators.length = 17
operator_exhaustive — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem operator_exhaustive : ∀ op : Operator, op ∈ allOperators
cel_validation_types — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
CEL validation type coverage requiresCELValidation is true exactly for unsafeState and marker.
theorem cel_validation_types :
severity_total_order — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Severity ordering is total
theorem severity_total_order :
∀ a b : Severity, a.toNat ≤ b.toNat ∨ b.toNat ≤ a.toNat
empty_predicate_no_fields — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Predicate emptiness An empty predicate yields no field paths.
theorem empty_predicate_no_fields
(p : UnsafePredicate) (h1 : p.any = []) (h2 : p.all = []) :
p.fieldPaths = []
Seclib.Schema.Types
validAssetType — ⚪ definition
def · source
Validation predicate for asset type strings. Go source: internal/core/kernel/asset_type.go regex
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_.-]*$
def validAssetType (s : String) : Bool
Severity.toNat — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Severity.toNat : Severity → Nat
| .info => 1
| .low => 2
| .medium => 3
| .high => 4
| .critical => 5
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : Ord Severity where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : LE Severity where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance (a b : Severity) : Decidable (a ≤ b)
Severity.max — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Severity.max (a b : Severity) : Severity
ControlType.requiresCELValidation — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ControlType.requiresCELValidation : ControlType → Bool
| .unsafeState => true
| .marker => true
| _ => false
ControlType.isEvaluatable — ⚪ definition
def · source
def ControlType.isEvaluatable : ControlType → Bool
| .unsafeState | .unsafeDuration | .unsafeRecurrence
| .prefixExposure | .marker => true
Operator.requiresValue — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Operator.requiresValue : Operator → Bool
| .missing => false
| .present => false
| .listEmpty => false
| _ => true
FieldPath — ⚪ definition
structure · source
FieldPath Go source: internal/core/predicate/field_path.go:14 Dot-separated property path, eagerly split into segments
structure FieldPath where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : BEq FieldPath where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : DecidableEq FieldPath
FieldPath.raw — ⚪ definition
def · source
def FieldPath.raw (fp : FieldPath) : String
FieldPath.hasPathPrefix — ⚪ definition
def · source
def FieldPath.hasPathPrefix (fp : FieldPath) (pfx : String) : Bool
FieldPath.stripPropertiesPrefix — ⚪ definition
def · source
def FieldPath.stripPropertiesPrefix (fp : FieldPath) : List String
IamExplainer.Checks
checkAdminEquiv — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkAdminEquiv (s : Statement) : List Finding
checkServiceWildcard — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkServiceWildcard (s : Statement) : List Finding
checkResourceWildcard — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkResourceWildcard (s : Statement) : List Finding
checkNotAction — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkNotAction (s : Statement) : List Finding
checkNotResource — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkNotResource (s : Statement) : List Finding
checkPassRole — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkPassRole (s : Statement) : List Finding
evaluate — ⚪ definition
def · source
def evaluate (p : Policy) : List Finding
IamExplainer.Condition
CondWarning — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CondWarning where
CondKeyVal — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CondKeyVal where
CondOp — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CondOp where
decodeCondBlocks — ⚪ definition
def · source
def decodeCondBlocks (cond : Option Json) : CondBlocks × List CondWarning
evalCond_noContext_tu — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem evalCond_noContext_tu (blocks : CondBlocks) :
(evalCond noContext blocks).1 = .t ∨ (evalCond noContext blocks).1 = .u
evalCond_noContext_T_imp — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem evalCond_noContext_T_imp (blocks : CondBlocks) (ctx : CondContext)
(h : (evalCond noContext blocks).1 = .t) :
(evalCond ctx blocks).1 = .t
IamExplainer.Emit
Need — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Need where
Needs — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Needs where
Transform — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Transform where
Residual — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Residual where
Withheld — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Withheld where
EmitReport — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure EmitReport where
hasWildcard — ⚪ definition
def · source
def hasWildcard (s : String) : Bool
allNeedResourcesExact — ⚪ definition
def · source
def allNeedResourcesExact (stmt : Statement) (ns : List Need) : Bool
touchingResources — ⚪ definition
def · source
def touchingResources (stmt : Statement) (ns : List Need) : List String
emitFixed — ⚪ definition
def · source
def emitFixed (p : Policy) (ns : Needs) : Policy × EmitReport
parseNeeds — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseNeeds (input : String) : Except String Needs
stmtToJson — ⚪ definition
def · source
def stmtToJson (s : Statement) : Json
policyToJson — ⚪ definition
def · source
def policyToJson (p : Policy) : Json
IamExplainer.Ghost.Aws
AwsGhostKind.defaultAssumption — ⚪ definition
def · source
def AwsGhostKind.defaultAssumption : AwsGhostKind → GhostAssumption
| .managedPolicyArn _ => .overPermissive
| .crossAccountRole _ _ => .overPermissive
| .serviceLinkedRole _ =>
AwsGhostKind.id — ⚪ definition
def · source
def AwsGhostKind.id : AwsGhostKind → String
| .managedPolicyArn arn => arn
| .crossAccountRole arn _ => arn
| .serviceLinkedRole sp => s!"aws-service-role/{sp}"
| .crossAccountResource arn => arn
| .unmodeledService arn => arn
AwsGhostKind.toRefStatus — ⚪ definition
def · source
def AwsGhostKind.toRefStatus (kind : AwsGhostKind) : RefStatus α
IamExplainer.Ghost.Parse
parseGhostKind — ⚪ definition
def · source
Parse ghost-annotated observation fields into RefStatus. When a reference field in the observation JSON carries
_ghost: trueplus a_ghost_kinddiscriminator, construct the appropriate AwsGhostKind and its default GhostAssumption. When_ghostis absent or false, construct RefStatus.resolved.
def parseGhostKind (j : Json) : Option AwsGhostKind
parseRefStatus — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseRefStatus [FromJson α] (j : Json) : Except String (RefStatus α)
IamExplainer.Ghost.XAGhost
xaTrustSeverity — ⚪ definition
def · source
Ghost-aware cross-account trust check. Retrofits XA.TRUST severity to operate on RefStatus Principal. Resolved: run severity classification. Ghost: emit critical (overPermissive = worst case). Proves ghostConservative.
def xaTrustSeverity (p : Principal) : FindingSeverity
xaTrustGhostCheck — ⚪ definition
def · source
def xaTrustGhostCheck (ref : RefStatus Principal) : FindingSeverity
critical_is_top — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem critical_is_top (s : FindingSeverity) : s ≤ .critical
xaTrust_ghost_conservative — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem xaTrust_ghost_conservative (ga : GhostAssumption) :
ghostConservative xaTrustSeverity ga .critical
IamExplainer.Grants
CondState.toString — ⚪ definition
def · source
def CondState.toString : CondState → String
| .t => "T"
| .f => "F"
| .u => "U"
| .none_ => "NONE"
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToString CondState
Grant — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Grant where
stmtGrants — ⚪ definition
def · source
def stmtGrants (ctx : Context) (condCtx : CondContext) (s : Statement) : List Grant
grants — ⚪ definition
def · source
def grants (ctx : Context) (condCtx : CondContext) (p : Policy) : List Grant
grantToJson — ⚪ definition
def · source
def grantToJson (g : Grant) : Json
IamExplainer.Layers
Layers — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Layers where
LayerVerdict — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure LayerVerdict where
LayerResult — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure LayerResult where
evalLayers — ⚪ definition
def · source
def evalLayers (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext) (layers : Layers)
(rcpServices : List String) (kind : DocKind) : LayerResult
noLayers — ⚪ definition
def · source
def noLayers : Layers
validateScp — ⚪ definition
def · source
def validateScp (p : Policy) : Option String
validateRcp — ⚪ definition
def · source
def validateRcp (p : Policy) : Option String
evalLayers_noLayers_blocked — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem evalLayers_noLayers_blocked (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(rcpSvcs : List String) (kind : DocKind) :
(evalLayers req ctx noLayers rcpSvcs kind).blocked = []
evalLayers_blocked_noContext_empty — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem evalLayers_blocked_noContext_empty (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(layers : Layers) (rcpSvcs : List String) (kind : DocKind)
(h : (evalLayers req ctx layers rcpSvcs kind).blocked = []) :
(evalLayers req noContext layers rcpSvcs kind).blocked = []
IamExplainer.Match
matchResourcePattern — ⚪ definition
def · source
def matchResourcePattern (pattern : String) (resource : String) : Bool
IamExplainer.Policy
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToJson Effect where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : FromJson Effect where
Statement — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Statement where
ParseWarning — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure ParseWarning where
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToJson ParseWarning where
parseStatement — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseStatement (j : Json) (idx : Nat) : Except String (Statement × List ParseWarning)
Policy — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Policy where
parsePolicy — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parsePolicy (input : String) : Except String (Policy × List ParseWarning)
IamExplainer.Principal
PrincipalType.toString — ⚪ definition
def · source
def PrincipalType.toString : PrincipalType → String
| .aws => "AWS"
| .federated => "Federated"
| .service => "Service"
| .canonicalUser => "CanonicalUser"
| .wildcard => "Wildcard"
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToString PrincipalType
Principal — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Principal where
isBareAccountId — ⚪ definition
def · source
def isBareAccountId (s : String) : Bool
normPrincipal — ⚪ definition
def · source
def normPrincipal (s : String) : Principal
parsePrincipals — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parsePrincipals (j : Json) : List Principal
Principal.isRoot — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Principal.isRoot (p : Principal) : Bool
Principal.accountId — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Principal.accountId (p : Principal) : Option String
Scope.toString — ⚪ definition
def · source
def Scope.toString : Scope → String
| .sameAccount => "SAME_ACCOUNT"
| .inOrg => "IN_ORG"
| .crossOrg => "CROSS_ORG"
| .pub => "PUBLIC"
| .federated => "FEDERATED"
| .service => "SERVICE"
| .unverified => "UNVERIFIED"
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToString Scope
Context — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Context where
condOrgIds — ⚪ definition
def · source
def condOrgIds (cond : Option Json) : List String
scopeOf — ⚪ definition
def · source
def scopeOf (ctx : Context) (p : Principal) (cond : Option Json) : Scope
DocKind.toString — ⚪ definition
def · source
def DocKind.toString : DocKind → String
| .identity => "IDENTITY"
| .trust => "TRUST"
| .resource => "RESOURCE"
| .mixed => "MIXED"
— ⚪ definition
instance · source
instance : ToString DocKind
detectKind — ⚪ definition
def · source
def detectKind (stmts : List Statement) : DocKind
IamExplainer.Proofs
Policy.removeStmt — ⚪ definition
def · source
Soundness theorems: policy transforms (T1-T3) and emitFixed can only narrow access, never grant new permissions. All theorems are universally quantified over the condition context.
def Policy.removeStmt (p : Policy) (i : Nat) : Policy
iamSem — ⚪ definition
def · source
def iamSem : PolicySem Statement Request CondContext where
removeAllow_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem removeAllow_narrows (p : Policy) (i : Nat)
(hi : i < p.statements.length)
(heff : (p.statements[i]'hi).effect = .allow)
(req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(h : allows (p.removeStmt i) req ctx = true) :
matchPattern_ci_congr — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem matchPattern_ci_congr (p s s' : String)
(h : matchActionPattern p s = true) (heq : ciEq s s' = true) :
matchActionPattern p s' = true
stmtGrantsAction_ci_congr — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem stmtGrantsAction_ci_congr (st : Statement) (ℓ a : String)
(h : stmtGrantsAction st ℓ = true) (heq : ciEq ℓ a = true) :
stmtGrantsAction st a = true
stmtGrantsAction_narrow — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem stmtGrantsAction_narrow (s new_stmt : Statement)
(hnew_notactions : new_stmt.notActions = none)
(hnew_actions : ∃ acts, new_stmt.actions = some acts ∧
allows_replaceAllow_mono — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem allows_replaceAllow_mono (p : Policy) (i : Nat) (hi : i < p.statements.length)
(heff : (p.statements[i]).effect = .allow)
(new_stmt : Statement) (hnew_eff : new_stmt.effect = .allow)
(hnew_res : new_stmt.resources = (p.statements[i]).resources)
(hnew_notres : new_stmt.notResources = (p.statements[i]).notResources)
(hnew_cond : new_stmt.condition = (p.statements[i]).condition)
(hgrants : ∀ a, stmtGrantsAction new_stmt a = true → stmtGrantsAction (p.statements[i]) a = true)
(req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(h : allows { p with statements
narrowActions_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem narrowActions_narrows
(p : Policy) (i : Nat)
(hi : i < p.statements.length)
(heff : (p.statements[i]).effect = .allow)
(new_stmt : Statement)
(hnew : new_stmt.effect = .allow)
(hnew_notactions : new_stmt.notActions = none)
(hnew_actions : ∃ acts, new_stmt.actions = some acts ∧
allows_replace_stmt_mono — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Generalized statement replacement mono
theorem allows_replace_stmt_mono (p : Policy) (i : Nat) (hi : i < p.statements.length)
(heff : (p.statements[i]).effect = .allow)
(new_stmt : Statement) (hnew_eff : new_stmt.effect = .allow)
(hnew_cond : new_stmt.condition = (p.statements[i]).condition)
(hmono : ∀ req, stmtMatches new_stmt req = true → stmtMatches (p.statements[i]) req = true)
(req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(h : allows { p with statements
narrowResources_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
NEW: narrowResources_narrows (T3)
theorem narrowResources_narrows
(p : Policy) (i : Nat)
(hi : i < p.statements.length)
(heff : (p.statements[i]).effect = .allow)
(new_stmt : Statement) (hnew_eff : new_stmt.effect = .allow)
(hnew_act : new_stmt.actions = (p.statements[i]).actions)
(hnew_notact : new_stmt.notActions = (p.statements[i]).notActions)
(hnew_cond : new_stmt.condition = (p.statements[i]).condition)
(hnew_notres : new_stmt.notResources = none)
(hnew_res : ∃ rlist, new_stmt.resources = some rlist ∧
emitFixed_narrows — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem emitFixed_narrows (p : Policy) (ns : Needs)
(hns : ∀ n ∈ ns.needs, '?' ∉ n.action.toList ∧ '*' ∉ n.action.toList)
(req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(h : allows (emitFixed p ns).1 req ctx = true) :
allows p req ctx = true
grants_complete — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Grants completeness and no-context conservatism
theorem grants_complete (p : Policy) (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(h : allows p req ctx = true) :
allows_nocontext_conservative — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem allows_nocontext_conservative (p : Policy) (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(h : allows p req ctx = true) :
layers_narrow — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
Layer theorems: layered evaluation only narrows access.
theorem layers_narrow (p : Policy) (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(layers : Layers) (rcpSvcs : List String) (kind : DocKind)
(h : (allowsLayered p req ctx layers rcpSvcs kind).allowed = true) :
allows p req ctx = true
layer_add_monotone — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem layer_add_monotone (p : Policy) (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(rcpSvcs : List String) (kind : DocKind)
(h : allows p req ctx = true) :
(allowsLayered p req ctx noLayers rcpSvcs kind).allowed = true
layered_nocontext_conservative — 🟢 proved
theorem · source
theorem layered_nocontext_conservative (p : Policy) (req : Request) (ctx : CondContext)
(layers : Layers) (rcpSvcs : List String) (kind : DocKind)
(h : (allowsLayered p req ctx layers rcpSvcs kind).allowed = true) :
(allowsLayered p req noContext layers rcpSvcs kind).allowed = true
IamExplainer.Report
Counts — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Counts where
countFindings — ⚪ definition
def · source
def countFindings (fs : List Finding) : Counts
Report — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure Report where
buildReport — ⚪ definition
def · source
def buildReport (findings : List Finding) (warnings : List ParseWarning) : Report
reportToJson — ⚪ definition
def · source
def reportToJson (r : Report) : Json
renderText — ⚪ definition
def · source
def renderText (r : Report) : String
IamExplainer.XAChecks
condHasKey — ⚪ definition
def · source
def condHasKey (cond : Option Json) (key : String) : Bool
checkXA — ⚪ definition
def · source
def checkXA (ctx : Context) (kind : DocKind) (s : Statement) : List Finding
xaWarnings — ⚪ definition
def · source
def xaWarnings (ctx : Context) (s : Statement) : List ParseWarning
Main
CliOpts — ⚪ definition
structure · source
structure CliOpts where
parseOpts — ⚪ definition
def · source
def parseOpts (args : List String) : CliOpts
loadAccounts — ⚪ definition
def · source
def loadAccounts (path : String) : IO (List String)
buildContext — ⚪ definition
def · source
def buildContext (opts : CliOpts) : IO Context
runExplain — ⚪ definition
def · source
def runExplain (opts : CliOpts) : IO UInt32
loadCondContext — ⚪ definition
def · source
def loadCondContext (opts : CliOpts) : IO CondContext
runGrants — ⚪ definition
def · source
def runGrants (opts : CliOpts) : IO UInt32
loadLayerDoc — ⚪ definition
def · source
def loadLayerDoc (path : String) : IO (Policy × List ParseWarning)
rcpServicesPath — ⚪ definition
def · source
def rcpServicesPath : String
loadRcpServices — ⚪ definition
def · source
def loadRcpServices : IO (List String)
runCan — ⚪ definition
def · source
def runCan (opts : CliOpts) : IO UInt32
runEmitFixed — ⚪ definition
def · source
def runEmitFixed (opts : CliOpts) : IO UInt32
main — ⚪ definition
def · source
def main (args : List String) : IO UInt32